Both Signature Bank and Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), located in the United States, have failed and have been taken over by regulatory institutions. While both failures are important, we want to focus on SVB as it was the 16th largest bank in the US with total assets of ~$216 billion and was part of the catalyst for the failure of Signature Bank.
SVB had been in business for 40 years with a focus on technology companies. The Bank, owned by SVB Financial, counted half of all US venture capital-backed startups as clients. In the low-rate environment that started following the 2007-2008 financial crisis, technology companies did very well as money was cheap and easy to access. As technology companies flourished so did SVB.
When COVID-19 hit and rates were slashed even lower, technology companies added significant amounts of deposits to SVB. SVB’s total funding increased from $60.12 billion at the end of 2019 up to $209.22 billion at the end of 2022. The majority of these new deposits were held in demand accounts (not locked into terms) meaning the companies could remove the funds whenever they needed them. A significant influx in deposits is generally not an issue as it provides liquidity to the financial institution; however, SVB needed somewhere to place the new funds. In the ultra-low-rate environment following the pandemic, asset yields were hard to come by and SVB decided to place the funds into investments with maturity dates well into the future (10-year fixed terms) to gain a higher return.
When you have a balance sheet comprised of short-term deposits and very long-term assets you create interest rate risk. In 2022, when interest rates significantly increased, the value of the investments SVB had purchased in 2020-2021 took a significant market value hit. While the investments themselves were still high quality, if SVB needed to sell them they would record a substantial loss on the investment. At the same time, SVB’s concentration in the technology sector was becoming an issue. As the cost of money increased, access to cash for technology companies was drying up and they were needing to pull more funds from the deposits they had stockpiled during the pandemic. As the deposits at SVB decreased they were running out of liquidity to pay depositors and were forced to sell some investments at a significant loss. The loss was so steep they needed to try and sell new common shares in an attempt to restructure the balance sheet.
When this happened, the market realized how badly SVB had structured its balance sheet and the stock plummeted. With the rise in liquidity concerns, venture capitalists and other technology industry investors urged depositors to pull their funds from SVB before it was too late. This resulted in a bank run and by March 10, only 48 hours later, SVB had collapsed.
While these issues are by no means isolated to SVB it is important to note there are significant differences between SVB and Innovation.
- There is a notable difference between US and Canadian regulatory environments. Canadian banks and federal credit unions are regulated by OSFI which is one of the best regulators in the world. US bank regulations are generally looser than in Canada. This is one of the reasons Canadian banks were able to weather the 2007-2008 financial crisis much better than their US counterparts.
- Although SVB was 65 times larger than Innovation they were subject to less regulatory requirements, especially around liquidity. Innovation is preparing to be OSFI regulated, and this includes regularly assessing liquidity risk using the liquidity coverage ratio and net cumulative cash flow. SVB was not required to track any of the OSFI standard liquidity ratios. Innovation is in a strong liquidity position.
- SVB had significant concentration risk by mainly focusing on one specific industry for funding. Innovation has a variety of funding sources including consumer; business; Municipalities, Universities, Schools, and Hospitals (MUSH); and third-party.
- Innovation regularly forecasts and reviews interest rate risk exposure. We keep a close eye on the mismatch between the length of our deposits and the length of our assets.
- Innovation has an incredibly strong capital position. At the end of February 2023 our total capital ratio was 15.92%, well above both the regulatory minimum of 10.50% and internal policy target minimums of 12.81%. Innovation has significant capital above regulatory and internal policy target minimum requirements.
In addition to strong capital and liquidity positions, Innovation has contingency plans in place for both capital and liquidity that are reviewed annually. Innovation has very effective governance led by a knowledgeable and active Board of Directors along with a closely followed risk appetite statement.
While the failure of banks in the US is concerning, Innovation remains in excellent financial health and the situation in the US should have no impact on our members.